The main task developed by Wittgenstein concerning the relations between language and thought was to insist on their conceptual aspect —which he called grammatical. In the first place this paper reviews the main conceptual rectifications Wittgenstein thought had to be made in order to improve the investigation of such relations. An argument that I have calle The Argument From Anyone To Everyone is examined in the middle part of the paper: it implies a closer look to Philosophical Investigations § 344-350. The point is that this argument prevents us from recognizing the need to accomplish such rectifications. The analysis of the argument leads to the conclusion that language and thought have to be ruled by the principie of systematicity of sense (of meaning) similar to the one commonly invoked by the cognitive sciences in general. The final part of the paper resorts to material from Zettel in order to present Wittgenstein criticism on the principie of systematicity of sense.