Reality and Reason The Practice of Science
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Ian Hacking approaches have been fundamental for the turn that Philosophy of Science has done towards the study of experimental practice. Hacking shows how the philosophy has concentrated traditionally in the representations of sideways science leaving the interventions out. But exactly the study of those interventions offers key contributions in order to understand very important aspects, such as the usual realistic position that scientists assume in their work.
The intervening practice allows asking questions about the realistic theories and the rationalists approaches, without implying an abandonment of realistic criteria when referring to objects which the scientist is working. The sense of Hacking's proposal is not the arguing of a new type of realism, but the extensive project of thinking about science not only as knowledge, but also like a material process of execution and of stable self-molding of ideas and facts.
práctica científica, intervención, realismo, autojustificación, estilos de razonamientoscientific practice, intervention, realism, self-justification, reasoning styles