Competition in Electricity and Natural Gas Markets, which Authority has Jjurisdiction?
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Based on the OECD literature and the analysis of the cases EBSA, EPM, Electricaribe, Electrohuila and Emgesa-Efigas, the authors explore the benefits of complementarity and the problem of inconsistency that are produced by the coexistence between the Superintendency of Public Services and the Superintendency of Industry and Commerce as enforcement authorities for the promotion and protection of competition. The authors argue that the current coexistence generates inefficiencies in the functioning of the Government, a situation that could be overcome if Law 142 of 1994 is modified in the sense of equating the enforcement tools. In addition, to overcome the risk of inconsistency, it is necessary for both authorities to advance in the alternatives recommended by the OECD to improve inter-institutional coordination, such as: (i) agreements to share information; (ii) exchange of officials; and (iii) preparation of joint reports, among others.
competition, energy, natural gas, market manipulation, public servicescompetencia, energía, gas natural, manipulación mercados, servicios públicos
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