Published Jun 30, 2019



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José Alfredo Torres Grimaldo

Abel María Cano Morales http://orcid.org/0000-0002-5141-2756

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Abstract

The popular savings and credit sector in Mexico has been characterized by low participation in the financial system; however, at the beginning of this century it showed great dynamism amidst a weak regulatory environment that led to the proliferation of alleged savings banks. For the year 2001, Mexico had 630 savings and credit entities with more than two million members. Therefore, it was essential to regulate this sector through the Popular Savings and Credit Law on June 4, 2001, in addition to reforming the General Law of Cooperative Societies. It should be mentioned that there must be a commitment on the part of companies to comply with the regulations on Corporate Governance, and that the administrators and managers of the Popular Financial Societies –SOFIPO– regularly and recurrently integrate Corporate Governance practices on its strategy of growth, strengthening and permanence in the sector.

Keywords

Popular savings and credit, popular financial company, corporate governanceahorro y crédito popular, gobierno corporativo, sociedad financiera popularpoupança popular e de crédito, empresa financeira popular, governança corporativa

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How to Cite
Torres Grimaldo, J. A., & Cano Morales, A. M. (2019). Importance of Corporate Governance in Popular Finance Companies in Mexico. Cuadernos De Contabilidad, 20(49), 1–16. https://doi.org/10.11144/Javeriana.cc20-49.igcs
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