Palabras clave
Dellsén
manifestationalism
observability
van Fraassen
Cómo citar
Resumen
En su reciente artículo “Expanding the Empirical Realm: Constructive Empiricism and Augmented Observation” (2024), Finnur Dellsén recuerda un caso bastante famoso que Gideon Rosen presentó contra el manifestacionalismo hace treinta años, y sostiene que se podría presentar un argumento análogo contra el empirismo constructivo de Bas van Fraassen. Este estudio pretende ser una respuesta a Dellsén: si bien la idea detrás de su artículo no carece de fundamento, no creo que se sostenga realmente. En resumen, la razón es que no tenemos el punto de vista de Dios y, por lo tanto, no estamos en condiciones de saber si una determinada teoría científica es empíricamente adecuada, y mucho menos verdadera. Una vez más, tal vez el empirismo constructivo siga representando la mejor posición presentada hasta ahora entre el empirismo estricto y el reconocimiento de la racionalidad de la ciencia.
Alspector-Kelly, M. (2001). Should the Empiricist Be a Constructive Empiricist? Philosophy of Science, 68(4), 413-431.
Alspector-Kelly, M. (2004). Seeing the Unobservable: van Fraassen and the Limits of Experience. Synthese, 140(3), 331-353. https://doi.org/10.1023/B:SYNT.0000031323.19904.45
Asay, J. & Bordner, S. S. (2015). A Modest Defense of Manifestationalism. Synthese, 192(1), 147-161. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-014-0556-5
Bourgeois, W. (1987). Discussion: On Rejecting Foss’s Image of Van Fraassen. Philosophy of Science, 54(2), 303-308.
Buekens, F. A. I. (1999). Observing in a Space of Reasons. Unpublished manuscript.
Buekens, F. A. I. & Muller, F. A. (2012). Intentionality Versus Constructive Empiricism. Erkenntnis, 76, 91-100. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-011-9348-1
Bueno, O. (2011). A evidência visual na ciência. Scientiæ Studia, 9(2), 267-90. https://doi.org/10.1590/S1678-31662011000200003
Chakravartty, A. (2007). A Metaphysics for Scientific Realism. Knowing the Unobservable. Cambridge University Press.
Chang, H. (2004a). A Case for Old-Fashioned Observability, and a Reconstructed Constructive Empiricism. In Proceedings Philosophy of Science Association 19th Biennial Meeting – PSA 2004: PSA 2004 Contributed Papers, Austin, pp. 876-887.
Chang, H. (2004b). Inventing Temperature: Measurement and Scientific Progress. Oxford University Press.
Churchland, P. M. (1985). The Ontological Status of Observables: In Praise of the Superempirical Virtues. In P. Churchland & C. Hooker (Eds.), Images of Science. Essays on Realism and Empiricism, with a Reply form Bas C. van Fraassen (pp. 35-47). The University of Chicago Press.
Contessa, G. (2006). Constructive Empiricism, Observability, and Three Kinds of Ontological Commitment. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, 37(3), 454-468.
Dellsén, F. (2024). Expanding the Empirical Realm: Constructive Empiricism and Augmented Observation. In Beisbart C. & Frauchiger M. (Eds.), Scientific Theories and Philosophical Stances: Themes from van Fraassen (pp. 127-146). De Gruyter.
Fraassen, B. C. van (1980). The Scientific Image. Clarendon Press.
Fraassen, B. C. van (1985). Empiricism in the Philosophy of Science. In P. Churchland & C. Hooker (Eds.), Images of Science. Essays on Realism and Empiricism, with a Reply form Bas C. van Fraassen (pp. 245-308). The University of Chicago Press.
Fraassen, B. C. van (2001). Constructive Empiricism now. Philosophical Studies, 106(1-2), pp. 151-170. https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1013126824473
Fraassen, B. C. van (2004). Preface to the Greek edition. URL: https://www.princeton.edu/~fraassen/books/pdfs/Sci_ImagePrefaceGreek.pdf
Fraassen, B. C. van (2005). The Day of the Dolphins. Puzzling Over Epistemic Partnership. In A. Irvine & K. Peacock (Eds.), Mistakes of Reason: Essays in Honour of John Woods (pp. 111-133). University of Toronto Press.
Fraassen, B. C. van (2008). Scientific Representation: Paradoxes of Perspective. Clarendon Press.
Kukla, A. (1996). The Theory-Observation Distinction. The Philosophical Review, 105(2), 173-230. https://doi.org/10.2307/2185717
Ladyman, J. (2004). Constructive Empiricism and Modal Metaphysics: A reply to Monton and van Fraassen. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 55 (4), 755-765.
Maxwell, G. (1962). The Ontological Status of Theoretical Entities. Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, 3, 3-27.
Monton, B. & Fraassen, B. C. van (2003). Constructive Empiricism and Modal Nominalism. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 54(3), 405-422. https://doi.org/10.1093/bjps/54.3.405
Railton, P. (1989). Explanation and Metaphysical Controversy. In P. Kitcher & W. C. Salmon (Eds.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Volume XIII: Scientific explanation (pp. 220-252). University of Minnesota.
Rosen, G. (1994). What Is Constructive Empiricism? Philosophical Studies, 74(2), 143-178. https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00989801
Seager, W. (1988). Scientific Anti-Realism and the Epistemic Community. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association, Vol. 1988, Volume One: Contributed Papers, pp. 181-187.
Sicha, J. F. (1992). Reviewed Work: Images of Science. Essays on Realism and Empiricism, with a Reply form Bas C. van Fraassen by P. M. Churchland; C. A. Hooker. Noûs, 26(4), 519-525.
Teller, P. (2001). Whither Constructive Empiricism? Philosophical Studies, 106(1-2), 123-150. https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1013170506726
Vollmer, S. (2000). Two Kinds of Observation: Why van Fraassen Was Right to Make a Distinction, but Made the Wrong One. Philosophy of Science, 67(3), 355-365. https://doi.org/10.1086/392785
Esta obra está bajo una licencia internacional Creative Commons Atribución 4.0.
Derechos de autor 2024 Alessio Gava